Compound’s review of StandardAero’s credit agreement finds $6,579.4 million of new debt the borrower could incur today, 7.58x Consolidated EBITDA of $867.7 million. Of that, $1,959.6 million, 2.26x, could rank pari passu with the existing term loans. The agreement has no J.Crew blocker, an open market purchase carve-out the document does not define, and only partial protection against Chewy-style guarantor releases and non-pro rata exchanges. Eight of the request’s flags trip.
The 7.58x rests on one feature and one assumption. Junior and unsecured debt is permitted on an interest coverage test of 1.75x as an alternative to the leverage tests, and sizing that test needs a rate on the new debt, which Compound set at 8%. On the leverage tests alone, total capacity is $4,363.0 million, 5.03x. Basket usage the borrower has not disclosed is set to zero. The results are the model’s reading of the document, not legal advice.
You are on the deal team of a direct lender reviewing a sponsor-backed borrower’s credit agreement before signing: the terms with their sections, the EBITDA definition, the capacity that exists today, the covenant, MFN, and whether the document blocks liability management transactions. We asked Compound to do that review on a real, recently filed agreement. It ran on November 19, 2026 and returned one Excel workbook of 12 sheets and a short written answer.
What the workbook shows:
- The agreement. StandardAero’s Credit Agreement of October 31, 2024, borrowers Dynasty Acquisition Co., Inc. and Standard Aero Limited, conformed through Amendment No. 1 of November 13, 2026: a $1,630M Term B-1, a $620M Term B-2, a $750M revolver and a $600M incremental.
- The EBITDA definition. 32 addback clauses and not one of them capped. Cost savings can be credited for actions up to 36 months out.
- EBITDA under the definition. $867.7 million for the twelve months to September 30, 2026, equal to reported Adjusted EBITDA. Every line in the company’s reconciliation is permitted.
- Debt capacity. A free-and-clear incremental of $867.7 million set by the 100% EBITDA grower, $614.6 million of ratio-based pari debt to 3.75x, and $1,814.6 million of general and other baskets.
- Payments and unrestricted subsidiaries. $2,742.6 million of dividend and buyback capacity, and $2,745.9 million that could move to unrestricted subsidiaries.
- The covenant and MFN. A springing 7.00x first lien net leverage test for the revolver only, with a 56.5% EBITDA cushion pro forma. The 100 bps MFN expired on April 30, 2025.
The agreement, the 8-K, the 10-K for fiscal 2025, the 10-Qs, the Schedule 13G/A and the 2026 proxy are from SEC EDGAR. The market capitalization behind the post-IPO dividend basket uses Compound’s closing prices and shares outstanding, and pro forma interest uses the SOFR forward curve at the close of November 19, 2026. No open-web source was needed. Every other input is marked “Analyst assumption” with a reason.
“I need to review a leveraged credit agreement the way a direct lender's deal team does before signing, on a real document. From SEC EDGAR, pick the credit agreement most recently filed as an exhibit by a U.S. public company whose largest shareholder is a private equity firm, with a term loan and a revolving credit facility. Build a workbook a credit committee can read: a term summary with every term cited to its section number; the Consolidated EBITDA definition broken into each addback with its cap, look-forward period and whether it is uncapped; Consolidated EBITDA computed under that definition from the latest 10-K and 10-Q, next to the company's reported Adjusted EBITDA; debt capacity today, split into the free-and-clear incremental amount with its grower, ratio-based incremental debt, and general and other debt baskets; restricted payment and investment capacity, including what could move to unrestricted subsidiaries; the financial covenant with its levels, test dates, springing trigger if any, and equity cure terms; MFN protection with its sunset and threshold; and a check of protections against liability management transactions: transfers of material intellectual property to unrestricted subsidiaries, release of guarantors that stop being wholly owned, open market purchases and non-pro rata exchanges, and which amendments need every affected lender. Flag uncapped cost-saving addbacks, addbacks above 25% of EBITDA, a missing blocker for any of those transactions, and debt capacity above one turn of EBITDA. Use the stored public data wherever it has the figure, and web search only for what it lacks. Put every input on an Assumptions sheet with one column that says where it came from: a cited source, or "analyst assumption" for a figure I would set myself, with the reason for the value you chose. Every output must be a live formula that traces back to the Assumptions sheet. Add a Sources sheet listing each data source, what it gave and its date. Deliver one Excel workbook and a short summary of the result, the flags, and what I would need from the borrower's counsel to firm it up. Cite every sourced figure.”
That is the request as we sent it, without its closing line, which asks that no name or email be put in the workbook.
Choosing the agreement: four later filings ruled out
StandardAero’s amended credit agreement is the latest exhibit on EDGAR that meets all three tests. Compound screened four agreements filed after it and listed why each fails.
Compound walked back through the EDGAR exhibit lists from November 19, 2026. Mach Natural Resources, filed November 19, has a term loan and no revolver. Red Robin, filed November 18, fails on ownership: its largest holder is an activist fund. Lulu’s Fashion Lounge, filed November 17, is a revolver-only ABL, and FTAI Infrastructure, the same day, has term loans only.
StandardAero’s 8-K of November 16, 2026 carries Amendment No. 1 as Exhibit 10.1, with the conformed agreement as an annex. Carlyle, which the agreement names as Sponsor and a Permitted Holder, holds 25.7% of the common stock according to the 10-Q for the quarter ended September 30, 2026. A Schedule 13G/A filed the same day puts the next-largest holder at 15.1%.
The amendment added $600 million of incremental term loans in the existing classes, $434.7 million to Term B-1 and $165.3 million to Term B-2, to repay the revolver and fund a $350 million accelerated share repurchase. Every figure from here on is pro forma for both.
The term summary, cited to section
Pro forma term loans are $2,810.6 million, priced at Term SOFR plus 2.25% and due October 31, 2031. The revolver is $750 million and due October 31, 2029.
| B | D | F | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 5 | Term | Key figure | Section |
| 9 | Term Loan B-1 (U.S. Borrower) | 2,064.7 | Preliminary Statements; §2.01(a) |
| 10 | Term Loan B-2 (Canadian Borrower, USD) | 785.3 | Preliminary Statements; §2.01(a) |
| 11 | Revolving Credit Facility | 750.0 | Preliminary Statements; §1.01 "Revolving Credit Commitments" |
| 12 | Pro forma Term Loans outstanding | 2,810.6 | Amendment No. 1, §1.1; Recitals |
| 13 | Maturity: Term Loans | 10/31/2031 | §1.01 "Maturity Date"(b) |
| 14 | Maturity: Revolving Credit Facility | 10/31/2029 | §1.01 "Maturity Date"(a) |
| 15 | Pricing: Term Loans | 2.25% | §1.01 "Applicable Rate"(a),(b) |
| 22 | Free-and-clear incremental | 867.7 | §2.14(a)(w) |
| 23 | Ratio-based incremental | 614.6 | §1.01 "Maximum Leverage Requirement"(a); §2.14(a)(x) |
| 24 | Ratio Debt (junior / unsecured) | 3,897.1 | §1.01 "Maximum Leverage Requirement"(b) |
| 26 | General debt basket | 477.2 | §7.01(l) |
| 30 | Financial covenant | 7.00x | §7.08 |
| 31 | Equity cure | 5 | §8.03(b)(ii) |
The term loans step down to a 2.00% margin at first lien net leverage of 3.00x or less. Actual leverage at September 30, 2026 was 2.64x. The incremental takes it to 3.04x pro forma, just over the step, so the margin resets to 2.25%. Amortization is 0.2545% a quarter from December 31, 2026, about 1% a year, and the 1% soft call on repricings lapsed six months after closing.
The excess cash flow sweep is 50%, stepping to 25% at 3.25x and to nothing at 2.75x. Change of control is a double trigger, and Required Lenders means more than 50%, with net short lenders disenfranchised. Affiliate lenders may hold up to 25% of the term loans.
The Consolidated EBITDA definition: 32 clauses, no caps
Compound broke the definition into 32 addback clauses, 27 in Consolidated EBITDA and five in Consolidated Net Income (our count), and found a cap on none. Pro forma cost savings run 36 months from the action and rest on a good-faith officer determination.
| B | D | E | F | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5 | Clause | Cap | Look-forward / timing | Uncapped? |
| 10 | (1)(e) Sponsor management, monitoring, transaction fees | No cap | None (historical only) | Yes |
| 15 | (1)(j) Restructuring, integration, business optimization, start-up, severance | No cap | None (historical only) | Yes |
| 16 | (1)(k) Pro Forma Cost Savings (cost savings, synergies, operating improvements) | No cap | 36 months after the action or transaction | Yes |
| 17 | Pro Forma Basis proviso (x): cost savings tied to Specified Transactions | No cap | 36 months after the action or transaction | Yes |
| 18 | (1)(l) Addbacks in model / QoE report / acquisition projections | No cap | None (historical only) | Yes |
| 24 | (1)(r) Run-rate EBITDA from New Contracts | No cap | Run-rate over the 12-month Test Period | Yes |
| 33 | CNI (a): extraordinary, nonrecurring, unusual items (good-faith determination) | No cap | None (historical only) | Yes |
| 34 | CNI (b): transaction costs and non-recurring professional fees | No cap | None (historical only) | Yes |
| 39 | Uncapped addback clauses | 32 | ||
| 40 | Capped addback clauses | 0 | ||
| 41 | De minimis: borrower may skip any adjustment below ($M per item per quarter) | 5.0 |
Three of the 32 are interest, taxes and D&A. The other 29 are the non-standard addbacks the flag counts, and the uncapped cost-savings flag trips on clause (1)(k) and the Pro Forma Basis proviso. The sheet’s reading notes add three points. Clause (1)(l) imports any addback of a type in the sponsor model, a quality-of-earnings report or acquisition projections, so the list is not exhaustive. Clauses (k), (l), (p) and (r) apply even where the item was never deducted from net income, so they can add earnings that are not in reported results. And the borrower may skip any adjustment below $5 million per item per quarter.
Clause (1)(r) credits the run-rate value of New Contracts as if they had run for the whole test period. The 25% addback flag does not trip, because it is tested on what has been reported.
EBITDA under the definition equals reported Adjusted EBITDA
Mapped line by line, the company’s reconciliation gives $867.7 million under the agreement, exactly its reported Adjusted EBITDA. Addbacks beyond interest, taxes and D&A are $50.3 million, 5.8% of EBITDA.
| B | E | F | G | H | I | J | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5 | Line item (company reconciliation) | FY2025 | 9M 2026 | 9M 2025 | LTM 9/30/2026 | Consolidated EBITDA (agreement) | Reported Adjusted EBITDA |
| 6 | Net income | 277.4 | 270.0 | 198.8 | 348.6 | 348.6 | 348.6 |
| 7 | (+) Income tax expense | 99.4 | 82.7 | 70.9 | 111.3 | 111.3 | 111.3 |
| 8 | (+) Interest expense | 174.2 | 119.9 | 132.2 | 162.0 | 162.0 | 162.0 |
| 9 | (+) Depreciation and amortization | 193.7 | 147.2 | 145.3 | 195.5 | 195.5 | 195.5 |
| 10 | (+) Business transformation costs (LEAP and CFM) | 26.0 | 10.3 | 21.4 | 14.9 | 14.9 | 14.9 |
| 11 | (+) Non-cash stock compensation expense | 13.2 | 15.7 | 10.0 | 19.0 | 19.0 | 19.0 |
| 12 | (+) Integration costs and severance | 5.6 | 0.8 | 4.6 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 1.8 |
| 13 | (-) Insurance recovery | (3.0) | 0.0 | (3.0) | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 14 | (+) Loss on disposals | 2.8 | 0.0 | 2.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 15 | (+) Secondary offering costs | 5.0 | 1.5 | 4.4 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 |
| 16 | (+) Other (sponsor fees, professional fees, R&W insurance) | 13.8 | 9.8 | 11.0 | 12.6 | 12.6 | 12.6 |
| 17 | Subtotal: reconciliation lines | 808.2 | 658.0 | 598.4 | 867.7 | 867.7 | 867.7 |
| 18 | (+) Pro Forma Cost Savings, not disclosed | 0.0 | |||||
| 19 | (+) Run-rate New Contracts, not disclosed | 0.0 | |||||
| 20 | (+) Parent public company costs, not disclosed | 0.0 | |||||
| 21 | EBITDA, LTM 9/30/2026 ($M) | 867.7 | 867.7 | ||||
| 23 | Consolidated EBITDA less reported Adjusted EBITDA | 0.0 |
Each line is mapped to the clause that permits it: business transformation costs to (1)(j), stock compensation to CNI (l), sponsor and professional fees to (1)(e) and CNI (b). None falls outside the definition. The largest single addback is stock compensation, $19.0 million or 2.2% of EBITDA.
For a lender the zero difference means the reported figure is the floor of covenant EBITDA, not an estimate of it. Rows 18 to 20 hold the three addbacks the definition allows and the filings do not disclose: pro forma cost savings, run-rate earnings from new contracts, and public company costs at the parent that fall away at the borrower. Compound set each to zero and marked it “Analyst assumption”. Each can only raise the number. They would show in the compliance certificate.
The floor matters because the capacity in the next three sections scales with EBITDA. The EBITDA Grower Amount is the higher of the latest test period and any prior one, so a basket sized off a peak never shrinks with earnings. Each extra dollar of Consolidated EBITDA adds a dollar to the free-and-clear incremental and $3.75 to ratio-based pari capacity (our arithmetic). The reconciliation itself is covered on adjusted EBITDA.
Debt capacity: the free-and-clear grower, ratio debt and the baskets
The free-and-clear incremental is $867.7 million, set by 100% of EBITDA rather than the $621.0 million fixed amount. Adding $614.6 million of ratio-based pari debt and the $477.2 million general basket, $1,959.6 million could rank equal with the existing term loans.
| B | D | E | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 35 | B. FREE-AND-CLEAR INCREMENTAL (Cash-Capped Incremental Facility) | Section | |
| 36 | Fixed amount | 621.0 | §2.14(a)(w)(i)(A) |
| 37 | Grower: % of EBITDA Grower Amount x EBITDA Grower Amount | 867.7 | §2.14(a)(w)(i)(B) |
| 38 | Greater of fixed and grower | 867.7 | §2.14(a)(w) |
| 39 | (-) Used to date | 0.0 | Amendment No. 1, §1.3, §2.3 |
| 40 | Free-and-clear incremental available | 867.7 | |
| 41 | Grower uplift over fixed amount | 246.7 |
None of the free-and-clear amount has been used: Amendment No. 1 deems the $600 million incremental incurred under the ratio-based facility, which left the fixed basket whole. The grower adds $246.7 million over the fixed amount. A free-and-clear basket of a full turn of EBITDA trips the one-turn flag on its own.
Ratio debt works through the Maximum Leverage Requirement, and its three prongs are alternatives. Pari first-lien debt is allowed to 3.75x first lien net leverage, which leaves $614.6 million. Junior-lien debt is allowed to 4.75x senior secured net leverage, unsecured debt to 5.00x total net leverage, and either may instead meet a 1.75x interest coverage test.
| B | D | E | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 43 | C. RATIO-BASED DEBT (Maximum Leverage Requirement; alternatives, not additive) | Section | |
| 44 | Pari first lien (Ratio-Based Incremental or Ratio Debt): max First Lien Net Leverage (x) | 3.75x | §1.01 "Maximum Leverage Requirement"(a) |
| 45 | Pari first lien capacity | 614.6 | §2.14(a)(x); §7.01 |
| 46 | Junior lien: max Senior Secured Net Leverage (x) | 4.75x | §1.01 "Maximum Leverage Requirement"(b) |
| 47 | Junior lien capacity, leverage prong | 1,482.4 | |
| 48 | Junior / unsecured: min Interest Coverage (x) | 1.75x | §1.01 "Maximum Leverage Requirement"(b)-(d) |
| 49 | Interest room before coverage falls to minimum | 311.8 | |
| 50 | Assumed cash rate on new junior / unsecured debt | 8.00% | |
| 51 | Junior / unsecured capacity, coverage prong | 3,897.1 | |
| 52 | Junior lien capacity (greater of prongs) | 3,897.1 | |
| 53 | Unsecured: max Total Net Leverage (x) | 5.00x | §1.01 "Maximum Leverage Requirement"(c),(d) |
| 54 | Unsecured capacity, leverage prong | 1,680.7 | |
| 55 | Unsecured capacity (greater of prongs) | 3,897.1 | |
| 56 | Largest ratio-based capacity | 3,897.1 |
Pro forma cash interest is $184.1 million against $867.7 million of EBITDA, coverage of 4.71x. Coverage can fall to 1.75x before the test fails, which leaves $311.8 million of extra annual interest. At an assumed 8% all-in rate, about three-month SOFR plus a junior spread for a BB-type issuer, that interest carries $3,897.1 million of new debt, more than twice the $1,680.7 million the 5.00x leverage prong allows. The coverage capacity moves inversely with the rate: at 10% it would be $3,117.7 million (our arithmetic).
StandardAero: new debt the agreement permits today
US$ millions, pro forma for Amendment No. 1 and the $350M share repurchase. Consolidated EBITDA of $867.7 million, LTM to September 30, 2026
Compound's Debt Capacity tab, the capacity summary. The §7.01(aa) basket for debt of up to 200% of restricted payment capacity, $6,092.6 million, is excluded from the total.
The general and other baskets add $1,814.6 million, led by the §7.01(l) general basket of $477.2 million, non-guarantor debt of $368.8 million and acquisition debt of $347.1 million. The general basket can be secured pari passu through the matching lien basket, which is why it sits in the pari total.
| B | D | E | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 72 | E. DEBT CAPACITY SUMMARY | $M | x EBITDA |
| 73 | Free-and-clear incremental | 867.7 | 1.00x |
| 74 | (+) Pari first lien ratio-based capacity | 614.6 | 0.71x |
| 75 | (+) General debt basket, securable pari via Permitted Liens (25) | 477.2 | 0.55x |
| 76 | First-lien capacity pari passu with existing Term Loans | 1,959.6 | 2.26x |
| 77 | Free-and-clear incremental | 867.7 | 1.00x |
| 78 | (+) Largest ratio-based capacity (pari, junior or unsecured) | 3,897.1 | 4.49x |
| 79 | (+) General and other debt baskets | 1,814.6 | 2.09x |
| 80 | Total incremental debt capacity today (excl. §7.01(aa)) | 6,579.4 | 7.58x |
| 81 | Flag threshold (turns of EBITDA) | 1.00x | |
| 82 | Result: first-lien pari capacity | FLAG | |
| 83 | Result: total incremental capacity | FLAG | |
| 84 | Memo: total incremental capacity using leverage prongs only (no interest-coverage prong) | 4,363.0 | 5.03x |
Both capacity flags trip, at 2.26x and 7.58x against a one-turn threshold. The pari figure is the one that matters most to a first-lien lender: almost $2 billion of new debt could share the collateral, on top of $2,810.6 million of term loans. The Inside Maturity Basket, the greater of $621.0M and 100% of EBITDA, lets $867.7 million of that debt mature before the term loans. For how this capacity would flow through a pro forma capital structure, see the debt schedule.
Restricted payments, investments and unrestricted subsidiaries
StandardAero could pay $2,742.6 million in dividends and buybacks today, 3.16x EBITDA. The same shared baskets, with the dedicated unrestricted subsidiary basket, would let $2,745.9 million move outside the credit group.
| B | D | E | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 15 | B. RESTRICTED PAYMENTS (dividends, buybacks) | Available $M | Section |
| 16 | Available Amount starter | 433.9 | §7.05(a)(i)(A) |
| 17 | Available Amount builder, prong (z): cumulative EBITDA less multiple of cumulative interest | 1,140.6 | §7.05(a)(i)(B) |
| 18 | (-) Available Amount used to date | 0.0 | |
| 19 | Available Amount available | 1,574.4 | §7.05(a) |
| 20 | §7.05(b)(10) general RP basket | 433.9 | §7.05(b)(10) |
| 21 | §7.05(b)(8) post-IPO basket, annual capacity | 638.4 | §7.05(b)(8) |
| 22 | (-) 2026 usage of §7.05(b)(8) (9M buybacks + ASR) | (500.1) | |
| 23 | §7.05(b)(8) remaining for calendar 2026 | 138.3 | |
| 24 | §7.05(b)(21) ratio basket: max Total Net Leverage for dividends / buybacks (x) | 3.75x | §7.05(b)(21)(x)(iii) |
| 25 | §7.05(b)(21) headroom (cash-funded payment raises net debt) | 596.0 | §7.05(b)(21) |
| 26 | Dividend and buyback capacity today | 2,742.6 | |
| 27 | x Consolidated EBITDA | 3.16x |
The Available Amount is the largest piece: a starter of the greater of $312.5M and 50% of EBITDA, plus a builder of cumulative EBITDA since the closing quarter, $1,652.3 million, less 150% of cumulative interest. The builder is the greatest of three prongs, so $1,140.6 million is a floor. The post-IPO basket allows 7% of market capitalization a year, $638.4 million on a $7,916.6 million market capitalization, and the 2026 buybacks and the share repurchase are allocated to it. Below 3.75x total net leverage, payments are unlimited: from 3.06x pro forma that leaves $596.0 million before the test binds.
Investments in any borrower or restricted subsidiary, guarantor or not, are unlimited, and a ratio basket allows acquisitions and similar investments to 4.00x total net leverage, $813.0 million of headroom.
| B | D | E | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 45 | D. VALUE THAT COULD MOVE TO UNRESTRICTED SUBSIDIARIES | Available $M | Section |
| 46 | §7.05(b)(19) dedicated Unrestricted Subsidiary basket | 303.7 | §7.05(b)(19) |
| 47 | (+) Available Amount (shared with dividends) | 1,574.4 | §7.05(a) |
| 48 | (+) §7.05(b)(10) general RP basket (shared) | 433.9 | §7.05(b)(10) |
| 49 | (+) Permitted Investments (12) general basket (shared) | 433.9 | §1.01 "Permitted Investments"(12) |
| 50 | Identified capacity to designate or fund Unrestricted Subsidiaries | 2,745.9 | §1.01 "Unrestricted Subsidiary"; §7.05 |
| 51 | x Consolidated EBITDA | 3.16x | |
| 52 | (+) Possible §7.05(b)(21) investment headroom (if a designation counts as a "similar Investment") | 813.0 | §7.05(b)(21)(x)(i) |
| 53 | Capacity including the ratio basket | 3,558.8 | |
| 54 | x Consolidated EBITDA | 4.10x | |
| 55 | Material IP blocker in the agreement? | No | §1.01 "Unrestricted Subsidiary" |
The dedicated basket is the greater of $217.5M and 35% of EBITDA, $303.7 million. The shared baskets bring capacity to $2,745.9 million, and to $3,558.8 million if a designation counts as a “similar Investment” under the 4.00x ratio basket, a reading the answer leaves to counsel. The restricted payment and unrestricted subsidiary figures draw on the same baskets and cannot both be used in full.
Restricted payment capacity also converts into debt. §7.01(aa) permits debt of up to 200% of the Available RP Capacity Amount, $3,046.3 million, which gives $6,092.6 million. Compound lists it as a memo and leaves it out of the 7.58x. The sheet also flags a drafting point in §7.05(b)(21): its acquisition prong reads “Interest Coverage Ratio does not exceed 1.75x”, which on its face favors weaker coverage.
The springing covenant, the equity cure and MFN
The only financial covenant is a 7.00x first lien net leverage maximum for the revolver, tested when usage net of cash is above 40% of commitments. Pro forma, EBITDA could fall 56.5% before it breaks. MFN protection expired 18 months ago.
| B | D | E | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 14 | B. SPRINGING TEST STATUS ($M) | 9/30/2026 actual | Pro forma |
| 15 | RCF loans outstanding | 270.0 | 0.0 |
| 16 | (-) Adjusted Cash and Cash Equivalents | (191.3) | (171.3) |
| 17 | Tested usage (floored at zero) | 78.7 | 0.0 |
| 18 | % of RCF commitments | 10.5% | 0.0% |
| 19 | Covenant tested? | No | No |
| 20 | RCF draws possible before the covenant springs | 221.3 | 300.0 |
| 21 | First Lien Net Leverage (x) | 2.64x | 3.04x |
| 22 | Cushion to covenant level (turns) | 4.36x | 3.96x |
| 23 | EBITDA cushion (EBITDA could fall by) | 62.3% | 56.5% |
The trigger is $300 million of usage on $750 million of commitments. At September 30, 2026, usage net of cash was $78.7 million, 10.5%, and pro forma the revolver is repaid, so the covenant is not tested on either date. The term loans are covenant-lite: term lenders can accelerate on a covenant breach only after the Required Revolving Lenders terminate and accelerate, and only the Required Revolving Lenders can amend or waive §7.08. For tracking a test like this quarter by quarter, see covenant compliance calculation.
The equity cure allows five cures over the life of the facilities and no more than two in any four consecutive quarters. The cure counts as EBITDA only, and the agreement states no cap on the cure amount, so a sponsor could over-cure.
MFN protection is 100 bps over the initial term loans’ all-in yield, with a sunset six months after the October 31, 2024 closing. It expired on April 30, 2025. While it ran, it covered only broadly syndicated term loans under the ratio-based incremental facility, and exception (4) let a further $867.7 million price freely. Required Lenders can amend it. The exception reads “(A) $621M and (B) 100%”. Compound reads it as the greater of the two and lists it for counsel to confirm.
The liability management check: J.Crew, Chewy and Serta
Two blockers are missing (J.Crew and open market purchases), two are partial (Chewy and non-pro rata exchanges), and one is present (Serta subordination, with an open-offer exception). Each result is a formula on cited indicators in the Assumptions sheet.
| B | D | E | G | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5 | Transaction | Blocker present? | Result | Section |
| 6 | J.Crew: transfer or exclusive license of material IP to an Unrestricted Subsidiary | No | FLAG: missing blocker | §1.01 "Unrestricted Subsidiary"; §7.05; §1.01 "Asset Sale"(m) |
| 7 | Chewy: release of a guarantor that stops being wholly owned | Partial | FLAG: partial blocker | §1.01 "Excluded Subsidiary"(b) and proviso; §9.11(c) |
| 8 | Serta (uptier): lien or payment subordination of the Loans | Yes, with open-offer exception | OK | §10.01 (final paragraphs) |
| 9 | Open market purchases (non-pro rata buybacks of Term Loans) | No | FLAG: missing blocker | §10.07(j); §2.13; §10.01 |
| 10 | Non-pro rata exchanges (Permitted Debt Exchange) | Partial | FLAG: partial blocker | §2.19; §1.01 "Permitted Debt Exchange Notes" |
J.Crew. Designating an unrestricted subsidiary needs only the absence of a payment or bankruptcy event of default and room under §7.05. There is no material-IP exclusion in the definition of “Unrestricted Subsidiary”, and exclusive IP licenses in the ordinary course are carved out of “Asset Sale” in clause (m). With $2,745.9 million of designation capacity, the missing blocker has real room behind it.
Chewy. A subsidiary that is not wholly owned is an Excluded Subsidiary under clause (b) of that definition, and §9.11(c) releases its guarantee automatically. A proviso says an existing guarantor is not an Excluded Subsidiary unless released under the agreement, which Compound calls circular. There is no test that the sale is a genuine one to an unaffiliated buyer, or that a release is not its purpose.
Serta. Subordinating the liens on all or substantially all of the collateral, or the loans in right of payment, needs each adversely affected lender, unless each is offered its pro rata share of the senior debt on the same terms with a three-Business-Day offer. That is why the flag reads “OK”. Subordination of less than substantially all of the collateral is not caught.
Open market purchases. Holdings and its subsidiaries may buy term loans by Dutch auction, which is pro rata, or by “open market purchase”, which §10.07(j) uses and does not define. Those buybacks are carved out of pro rata sharing in §2.13. Pro rata sharing and the §8.04 waterfall are not among the each-lender rights in §10.01, so Required Lenders can change them.
Non-pro rata exchanges. Exchange offers under §2.19 allocate ratably among tendering lenders, and the exchange notes may be unsecured, pari or junior, never senior. The text does not say the offer must go to every lender in a class.
The sacred rights are otherwise standard: each lender for its commitment, each affected lender for payment dates, principal, rate and fees, and every lender for voting and a release of all or substantially all collateral or guaranty value.
What the public filings cannot tell you
The filed agreement sets the terms. How much of each basket is used, what sits outside the credit group and what the compliance certificate adds come from borrower’s counsel. Compound’s answer ends with the list.
- The latest compliance certificate with the EBITDA build. Cost savings, run-rate gains from new contracts, quality-of-earnings addbacks, and the bridge from the borrower’s EBITDA to the public parent’s. These replace the three zeros in the EBITDA Calc.
- Basket usage to date, including which baskets paid for the 2026 buybacks and the $350 million share repurchase. Every capacity figure assumes zero usage outside the post-IPO basket.
- The list of unrestricted and excluded subsidiaries, where the material IP sits, and any exclusive IP licenses to companies that do not guarantee the loans. This sizes the J.Crew exposure.
- Confirmation of two readings: the MFN exception’s “(A) $621M and (B) 100%” as a greater-of, and the direction of the 1.75x interest coverage test in §7.05(b)(21).
- What counts as an open market purchase, and whether debt exchange offers must go to every lender in a class.
- Whether J.Crew, Chewy and full Serta protections can be added in the pending revolver extension.
- A clean conformed copy and the schedules. The filed version shows deleted and added text run together.
Our view
The review gives a credit committee what it needs: a borrower with low leverage under a document that would let it take on several turns of new debt and move value out of the credit group with little lender say. We would treat the terms as the risk and the current leverage as the cushion.
At 3.04x first lien net leverage and 4.71x interest coverage, StandardAero is lightly levered against its own ratios, which is why ratio capacity is so large. The definition adds to that: 32 uncapped clauses, 36-month cost savings and run-rate contract value can raise Consolidated EBITDA above the reported floor, and every basket here grows with it. The missing blockers matter because there is room behind each of them.
The other side is that the 7.58x headline leans on the coverage prong, the 8% rate and zero usage of undisclosed baskets. On leverage tests alone the total is 5.03x, and the figure a first-lien lender would weigh most is the pari 2.26x.
Three things would change our view: a compliance certificate with material undisclosed addbacks, which would raise every capacity figure; a basket usage schedule that shows the 2026 buybacks used the ratio basket rather than the post-IPO one; and a revolver extension that adds the missing blockers. From here the work moves to a direct lending underwriting model on the borrower’s projections and a credit memo that carries the terms into the committee recommendation.
StandardAero credit agreement review (Excel)Compound’s workbook from this run: a Summary and Flags, the Term Summary cited to section, the EBITDA Definition clause by clause, the EBITDA Calc against reported Adjusted EBITDA, Debt Capacity, RP and Investments, the Covenant, MFN, the LME Check, an Assumptions sheet with a source or reason beside every input, and Sources.Download · FreeFAQ
How is free-and-clear incremental capacity sized with a grower?
The free-and-clear amount is the greater of a fixed dollar figure and a percentage of EBITDA, so it grows with earnings and, where the grower looks back to the highest test period, never shrinks. In StandardAero’s agreement it is the greater of $621.0 million and 100% of EBITDA, which sets it at $867.7 million today, one full turn.
What is a J.Crew blocker in a credit agreement?
It is a provision that stops the borrower from transferring or exclusively licensing material intellectual property to an unrestricted subsidiary, outside the lenders’ collateral. Compound found none in StandardAero’s agreement: designation needs only room under the payment baskets, and exclusive IP licenses in the ordinary course are carved out of asset sales.
Why does the interest coverage prong create so much ratio debt?
An interest coverage alternative to the leverage test lets a lightly levered borrower add debt until interest rises to the minimum coverage, so capacity depends on the rate on the new debt as much as on EBITDA. At 1.75x and an assumed 8% rate, StandardAero’s prong allows $3,897.1 million, against $1,680.7 million under the 5.00x leverage test.
How does a Serta blocker work, and what does it miss?
It makes subordination of the loans, in lien or payment, a right of each affected lender, so a majority cannot prime the minority. StandardAero’s version allows subordination if every affected lender is offered its pro rata share, and it covers only all or substantially all of the collateral. Pro rata sharing and the waterfall remain Required Lender matters.
Does an expired MFN still matter to a lender?
Yes, because it sets what a new incremental can be priced at without repricing the existing loans. StandardAero’s 100 bps MFN expired on April 30, 2025, so new pari debt can now be priced above the existing term loans without any adjustment to them, and Required Lenders could amend the provision in any case.





