Compound’s analysis of Sinclair Television Group’s February 2025 uptier puts the stressed enterprise value at $2,414.7 million. At that value the old pari passu first lien recovers 58.7% before the transaction. After it, the first-out recovers 100% and the second-out 22.3%. The holdouts recover 0%: the Term Loan B-3 and revolver lenders the Seventh Amendment subordinated to a third lien, and the 4.125% noteholders whose liens were released. The fulcrum moves from the first lien to the second-out, and two of the three flags in the request trip.
The 0% follows from the value, and the value is an assumption. Compound took $382 million of trough EBITDA, the local media segment’s fiscal 2025, and applied 6.3x: the low end of three broadcast peers less half a turn, which is the analyst’s discount. In the model the holdouts recover nothing until enterprise value reaches about $4.1 billion, roughly 11x trough EBITDA. These are the model’s results under its stressed value. They are not a view on Sinclair’s credit or on where its debt trades.
You are at a credit fund that invests in stressed and distressed debt. When a borrower closes a non-pro-rata uptier, you need the capital structure before and after, what each holder received, where value moved between those who joined and those who did not, and whether the new structure has the runway to reach its next maturity. We asked Compound to run that analysis on a real transaction from public filings. It ran on November 19, 2026 and returned one Excel workbook of eleven sheets and a short written answer.
What the workbook shows:
- The transaction. $1,430 million of new-money first-out notes, par-for-par exchanges into second-out and second-lien debt, two buybacks below par, and holdouts pushed to third lien or left unsecured.
- The capital structure. $4,165.0 million of funded debt before, in two ranks of corporate debt. $4,253.4 million after close, in five.
- The economics. Every exchange is at 1.00x, so the company captured only $13.3 million of discount. Annual cash interest rises $56.6 million, and the weighted average maturity goes from 3.5 to 6.5 years.
- Recoveries. At $2,342.2 million of distributable value, the fulcrum moves from the first lien at 58.7% to the second-out at 22.3%.
- Value by holder group. Participating holders net $60.0 million less at the stressed value, and non-participating holders $41.3 million less.
- Runway. $894 million of credit group liquidity at September 30, 2026 is still $686.6 million after eight quarters at trough EBITDA. The next maturity wall is 2029.
- The flags. A non-participating class lost more than 20 points: yes, 58.7 points. New money primes existing first lien: yes. A maturity inside the runway: no, by 37 days.
The transaction terms, the debt tables, the segment results and the liquidity come from Sinclair’s 8-Ks, 10-Ks and 10-Qs on SEC EDGAR. SOFR at closing and at the latest fixing is from the New York Fed. Peer market values and balance sheets come from Compound’s company financials and prices, with consensus EBITDA estimates for fiscal 2026 and 2027. The Sources sheet notes that no web search was needed. Every other input is marked as an analyst assumption with its reason.
“I invest in stressed credit and want to analyse a liability management transaction the way a creditor would, on a real deal. From SEC EDGAR, pick one U.S. public company that completed an uptier exchange, drop-down financing or distressed debt exchange in the last 24 months, with the transaction disclosed in an 8-K and the new and amended agreements filed as exhibits. Build the capital structure before and after the transaction, with each tranche's amount, rate, maturity, lien priority and guarantors, and the price each holder received or paid. Show the value captured or given up by participating and non-participating lenders: the exchange ratio, the discount captured by the company, the change in cash interest and in maturities, and recoveries for each class before and after at a stressed enterprise value set from the company's trough EBITDA and peer multiples. Identify the fulcrum security before and after, the liquidity runway for eight quarters, and the next maturity wall. Add a sensitivity table of recovery for a non-participating lender to the enterprise value. Flag a non-participating class whose recovery fell by more than 20 points, a maturity inside the runway, and new money that primes existing first-lien debt. Use the stored public data wherever it has the figure, and web search only for what it lacks. Put every input on an Assumptions sheet with one column that says where it came from: a cited source, or "analyst assumption" for a figure I would set myself, with the reason for the value you chose. Every output must be a live formula that traces back to the Assumptions sheet. Add a Sources sheet listing each data source, what it gave and its date. Deliver one Excel workbook and a short summary of the result, the flags, and what I would need from the company or its advisers to firm it up. Cite every sourced figure.”
That is the request as we sent it, without its closing line, which asks that no name or email be put in the workbook.
Choosing the transaction: Sinclair’s February 2025 uptier
Compound chose Sinclair Television Group, Inc. (STG), the borrower under Sinclair’s credit agreement. Its non-pro-rata uptier closed on February 12, 2025, and the closing 8-K filed the next day carries every document a creditor needs to rank the claims.
A Form 8-K filed on January 14, 2025 announced the transaction support agreement. The closing 8-K of February 13, 2025 attached the three new indentures, Supplemental Indenture No. 4, which released the 4.125% notes’ liens, stripped their covenants and ended their intercreditor, the new credit agreement, and the Seventh Amendment, which put the holdouts in a third lien.
The deal had four parts:
- New money: “$1,430M of 8.125% first-out first-lien notes due 2033”, in the answer’s words. The proceeds repaid the $1,175 million Term Loan B-2 due 2026, bought back $63.6 million of 4.125% secured notes at 84 and $104 million of 5.125% notes at 97, and paid fees.
- Term loans and revolver: Term Loan B-3 into B-6 at SOFR + 3.30% due 2029, and B-4 into B-7 at SOFR + 4.10% due 2030, both second-out. $575 million of revolver commitments moved into a first-out revolver.
- The 4.125% notes: $432 million exchanged into 9.750% second-lien notes and $238 million into 4.375% second-out notes.
- Holdouts: $2.7 million of B-3 and $75 million of revolver commitments were pushed to third lien. The $4 million of 4.125% notes not tendered became unsecured.
The capital structure before and after
At December 31, 2024, STG had $4,165.0 million of funded debt and $650.0 million of undrawn revolver commitments. All $3,357.0 million of term loans and secured notes ranked pari passu first lien (our arithmetic), with $759 million of unsecured notes behind them. After close, funded debt is $4,253.4 million, split across first-out, second-out, second lien, third lien and unsecured.
| B | C | F | G | J | M | P | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 6 | Tranche | Lien / ranking | Funded principal | Undrawn commitment | Coupon / spread | Maturity | Market price (% of par) |
| 7 | Revolving credit facility (tranche maturing Apr 2027) | First lien (pari passu) | 0.0 | 612.5 | 2.000% | 4/21/2027 | |
| 8 | Revolving credit facility (tranche maturing Dec 2025) | First lien (pari passu) | 0.0 | 37.5 | 2.000% | 12/4/2025 | |
| 9 | Term Loan B-2 | First lien (pari passu) | 1,175.0 | 0.0 | 2.500% | 9/30/2026 | 98.7% |
| 10 | Term Loan B-3 | First lien (pari passu) | 714.0 | 0.0 | 3.000% | 4/1/2028 | 80.5% |
| 11 | Term Loan B-4 | First lien (pari passu) | 731.0 | 0.0 | 3.750% | 4/21/2029 | 80.6% |
| 12 | 4.125% Senior Secured Notes due 2030 | First lien (pari passu) | 737.0 | 0.0 | 4.125% | 12/1/2030 | 74.1% |
| 13 | 5.125% Senior Notes due 2027 | Unsecured | 274.0 | 0.0 | 5.125% | 2/15/2027 | 90.9% |
| 14 | 5.500% Senior Notes due 2030 | Unsecured | 485.0 | 0.0 | 5.500% | 3/1/2030 | 67.6% |
| 15 | Debt of variable interest entities | Structurally senior (VIE level) | 7.0 | 0.0 | |||
| 16 | Finance leases | Structurally senior (leased assets) | 30.0 | 0.0 | |||
| 17 | Finance leases - affiliate | Structurally senior (leased assets) | 12.0 | 0.0 | |||
| 18 | Total | 4,165.0 | 650.0 |
Before the deal the first lien was one class. The two revolver tranches, Term Loans B-2, B-3 and B-4 and the 4.125% notes shared the same collateral and the same rank, and the market priced them very differently: 98.7% of par for the B-2 due in 2026 against 74.1% for the 4.125% notes due 2030. The 5.500% unsecured notes traded at 67.6%.
| B | C | F | G | J | M | R | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 21 | Tranche | Lien / ranking | Funded principal | Undrawn commitment | Coupon / spread | Maturity | Holder status |
| 22 | First-Out Revolving Credit Facility | First-out first lien | 0.0 | 575.0 | 2.000% | 2/12/2030 | Participating |
| 23 | 8.125% First-Out First Lien Notes due 2033 | First-out first lien | 1,430.0 | 0.0 | 8.125% | 2/15/2033 | New money |
| 24 | Term Loan B-6 | Second-out first lien | 711.4 | 0.0 | 3.300% | 12/31/2029 | Participating |
| 25 | Term Loan B-7 | Second-out first lien | 731.3 | 0.0 | 4.100% | 12/31/2030 | Participating |
| 26 | 4.375% Second-Out First Lien Notes due 2032 | Second-out first lien | 238.0 | 0.0 | 4.375% | 12/31/2032 | Participating |
| 27 | 9.750% Second Lien Notes due 2033 | Second lien | 432.0 | 0.0 | 9.750% | 2/15/2033 | Participating |
| 28 | Term Loan B-3 (non-participating) | Third lien (covenants stripped) | 2.7 | 0.0 | 3.000% | 4/1/2028 | Non-participating |
| 29 | Revolver commitments, non-participating (Apr 2027) | Third lien (covenants stripped) | 0.0 | 37.5 | 2.000% | 4/21/2027 | Non-participating |
| 30 | Revolver commitments, non-participating (Dec 2025) | Third lien (covenants stripped) | 0.0 | 37.5 | 2.000% | 12/4/2025 | Non-participating |
| 31 | 4.125% Notes due 2030 (non-tendered, liens released) | Unsecured (liens released, covenants stripped) | 4.0 | 0.0 | 4.125% | 12/1/2030 | Non-participating |
| 32 | 5.125% Senior Notes due 2027 (not repurchased) | Unsecured | 170.0 | 0.0 | 5.125% | 2/15/2027 | Non-participating |
| 33 | 5.500% Senior Notes due 2030 | Unsecured | 485.0 | 0.0 | 5.500% | 3/1/2030 | Not offered |
| 34 | Debt of variable interest entities | Structurally senior (VIE level) | 7.0 | 0.0 | n/a | ||
| 35 | Finance leases | Structurally senior (leased assets) | 30.0 | 0.0 | n/a | ||
| 36 | Finance leases - affiliate | Structurally senior (leased assets) | 12.0 | 0.0 | n/a | ||
| 37 | Total | 4,253.4 | 650.0 |
The guarantors did not change, so the transaction moved value by rank alone. The $1,430 million of new money and the $575 million first-out revolver sit at the top of the first lien. The exchanged term loans and the 4.375% notes sit behind them as second-out, sharing the same collateral but paid only after the first-out is whole. The 9.750% notes hold a second lien, and $2.7 million of B-3 and $75 million of revolver commitments hold a third.
The Cap_Table also carries the current structure at September 30, 2026. Since close, B-6 has fallen to $608 million and B-7 to $624 million, the remaining 5.125% notes have been repurchased, and a $225 million A/R securitization drawn in November 2025 sits ahead of everything on the receivables it bought.
Exchange terms, the discount captured, cash interest and maturities
Every exchange was par for par, so the company captured discount only on the two cash buybacks: $13.3 million, against market prices that would have given it more. Annual cash interest rises by $56.6 million, 14.8% of trough EBITDA, and the weighted average maturity extends by 3.0 years.
| B | C | E | F | H | I | M | P | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5 | Leg | Principal exchanged / repaid | Price / exchange rate (% of par) | New principal or cash | Discount captured by company | Pre-deal market price (% of par) | Change in rate (bps) | Maturity extension (years) |
| 6 | Term Loan B-2 repaid in full | 1,175.0 | 100.0% | 1,175.0 | 0.0 | 98.7% | n/a | n/a |
| 7 | Term Loan B-3 exchanged into Term Loan B-6 | 711.4 | 100.0% | 711.4 | 0.0 | 80.5% | 30 | 1.7 |
| 8 | Term Loan B-4 exchanged into Term Loan B-7 | 731.3 | 100.0% | 731.3 | 0.0 | 80.6% | 35 | 1.7 |
| 9 | Revolver commitments exchanged into First-Out RCF | 575.0 | 100.0% | 575.0 | 0.0 | 0 | 2.8 | |
| 10 | 4.125% secured notes exchanged into 9.750% second lien notes | 432.0 | 100.0% | 432.0 | 0.0 | 74.1% | 563 | 2.2 |
| 11 | 4.125% secured notes exchanged into 4.375% second-out notes | 238.0 | 100.0% | 238.0 | 0.0 | 74.1% | 25 | 2.1 |
| 12 | 4.125% secured notes repurchased for cash | 63.6 | 84.0% | 53.4 | 10.2 | 74.1% | n/a | n/a |
| 13 | 5.125% senior notes repurchased for cash | 104.0 | 97.0% | 100.9 | 3.1 | 90.9% | n/a | n/a |
| 14 | New money: 8.125% First-Out Notes issued | 1,430.0 | 100.0% | 1,430.0 | 0.0 | n/a | n/a | n/a |
| 15 | Total, existing debt legs | 4,030.3 | 4,017.0 | 13.3 |
The company paid 84 for 4.125% notes the market valued at 74.1% at December 31, 2024, and 97 for 5.125% notes at 90.9%. Measured against those prices, it paid $12.7 million above market on the buybacks. The reported accounts show the same small result: an $8 million gain on extinguishing the two notes and a $6 million loss on repaying B-2, a net gain of $2 million.
The exchanges cost the company coupon instead. B-6 and B-7 pay 30 and 35 basis points more than B-3 and B-4. The 4.375% second-out notes pay 25 basis points more than the 4.125% notes. The $432 million that went into second-lien notes moves from 4.125% to 9.750%, 563 basis points more, the largest single step-up in the deal.
| B | C | |
|---|---|---|
| 25 | C. CHANGE IN CASH INTEREST (ANNUALIZED, SOFR AT CLOSING) | |
| 26 | Pre-transaction annual cash interest | 269.1 |
| 27 | Post-transaction annual cash interest | 325.6 |
| 28 | Change in annual cash interest | 56.6 |
| 29 | Change as % of trough EBITDA | 14.8% |
| 30 | Weighted average cash cost, pre | 6.46% |
| 31 | Weighted average cash cost, post | 7.66% |
| 32 | Change in weighted average cash cost (bps) | 120 |
| 34 | D. CHANGE IN MATURITIES (MEASURED FROM CLOSING) | |
| 35 | Weighted average maturity, pre (years) | 3.5 |
| 36 | Weighted average maturity, post (years) | 6.5 |
| 37 | Extension (years) | 3.0 |
| 38 | Company-stated weighted average maturity after transaction (years) | 6.6 |
| 39 | Earliest funded maturity, pre | 9/30/2026 |
| 40 | Earliest funded maturity, post | 2/15/2027 |
| 41 | Funded debt due inside the 8-quarter window, pre (from Dec 31, 2024) | 1,175.0 |
| 42 | Funded debt due inside the 8-quarter window, post (from Mar 31, 2025) | 170.0 |
Weighted average cash cost goes from 6.46% to 7.66%, up 120 basis points. The model’s weighted average maturity after close is 6.5 years, against the 6.6 years the company stated in the support agreement 8-K. The earliest funded maturity moves from September 30, 2026 to February 15, 2027, and debt due inside the eight quarters after each balance sheet date falls from $1,175.0 million to $170.0 million, the 5.125% notes not bought back.
Setting the stressed enterprise value
Trough EBITDA of $382 million times a 6.3x stressed multiple gives an enterprise value of $2,414.7 million, and $2,342.2 million to distribute after 3% for administrative and priority claims. That is 0.51x the claims the pre-transaction structure would have had at default.
The credit group is Sinclair Broadcast Group and STG, which Sinclair reports as its local media segment. Sinclair, Inc.’s other businesses sit outside it and are left out. Segment EBITDA ran $456 million in 2023, $777 million in 2024 and $382 million in 2025, so the trough is the 2025 off-cycle year, after a $24 million disposal gain is taken out.
| B | C | D | E | F | G | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 15 | Peer | Enterprise value ($M) | EBITDA FY2026E ($M) | EBITDA FY2027E ($M) | Blended EBITDA ($M) | EV / blended EBITDA (x) |
| 16 | Nexstar Media Group (NXST) | 17,293 | 2,896 | 2,174 | 2,535 | 6.8x |
| 17 | Gray Media (GTN) | 6,790 | 1,121 | 653 | 887 | 7.7x |
| 18 | E.W. Scripps (SSP) | 3,085 | 452 | 281 | 366 | 8.4x |
| 19 | Low | 6.8x | ||||
| 20 | Median | 7.7x | ||||
| 21 | Mean | 7.6x | ||||
| 22 | High | 8.4x |
Nexstar trades at 6.8x, Gray Media at 7.7x and E.W. Scripps at 8.4x blended consensus EBITDA, and Sinclair, Inc. itself at 6.9x, for reference only. The model takes the low end and subtracts a 0.5x distress discount, “half a turn for a forced-sale or post-default buyer on top of trough EBITDA” in the Assumptions sheet’s words. The multiple comes from EBITDA that averages a political year and an off year, and it is applied to the off-year trough.
| B | C | |
|---|---|---|
| 25 | C. STRESSED ENTERPRISE VALUE | |
| 26 | Peer multiple used (x) | 6.8x |
| 27 | (-) Distress discount (x) | 0.5x |
| 28 | Stressed multiple (x) | 6.3x |
| 29 | Trough EBITDA ($M) | 382 |
| 30 | Stressed enterprise value ($M) | 2,415 |
| 31 | (-) Administrative and priority claims | 72 |
| 32 | Distributable value ($M) | 2,342 |
| 33 | Stressed EV / pre-transaction claims at default (x) | 0.51x |
The 3% administrative and priority claim, an analyst assumption, takes $72.4 million off the top.
Recoveries and the fulcrum, before and after
Before the transaction, the pari passu first lien recovers 58.7% and is the fulcrum, and the unsecured notes recover nothing. After it, the first-out recovers 100%, the second-out 22.3% as the new fulcrum, and the second lien, third lien and unsecured classes nothing.
| C | D | F | H | J | L | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 6 | Class (post / current name) | Pre: claims | Pre: recovery (%) | Post: claims | Post: recovery (%) | Change (pts) |
| 7 | Structurally senior (asset-level claims) | 49.0 | 100.0% | 49.0 | 100.0% | 0.0% |
| 8 | First-out first lien | 3,909.5 | 58.7% | 1,918.8 | 100.0% | 41.3% |
| 9 | Second-out first lien | 0.0 | n/a | 1,680.7 | 22.3% | n/a |
| 10 | Second lien | 0.0 | n/a | 432.0 | 0.0% | n/a |
| 11 | Third lien | 0.0 | n/a | 66.5 | 0.0% | n/a |
| 12 | Unsecured | 759.0 | 0.0% | 659.0 | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| 13 | 4,717.5 | 4,805.9 |
The waterfall runs on strict priority, and the Recovery tab notes that all distributable value is treated as collateral of the secured classes. Revolvers are drawn to 85% of commitments at default, an analyst assumption. Before the deal that puts $3,909.5 million of first-lien claims against $2,293.2 million of value after the structurally senior leases and VIE debt.
After the deal, the first-out claim is $1,918.8 million: the $1,430 million of new notes and the first-out revolver drawn to $488.8 million. It is covered in full. The second-out’s $1,680.7 million of claims then shares $374.5 million, which is the 22.3%. Nothing reaches the $432 million second lien, the $66.5 million third lien or the $659 million of unsecured claims.
The answer names the fulcrum in each structure: “the pari passu first lien before the deal; the second-out first lien (B-6, B-7, 4.375% notes) after.” The old first lien became a money-good senior class and a junior class that holds the equity risk. For readers who want the waterfall mechanics on their own, the recovery analysis of iHeartMedia builds the same stressed value and creditor waterfall on a structure without an uptier.
Who gained and who gave up value
At the stressed value, participating holders net $60.0 million less than under the old structure and non-participating holders $41.3 million less. Together that is about the $100.7 million of new money that went to fees, expenses and accrued interest rather than to existing holders. Within the participants the split is wide.
Value captured or given up at the stressed enterprise value, by holder group
US$ millions: recovery or cash price after the transaction less recovery before, times principal
Compound's Exchange tab, rows 48 to 60. Holdouts in amber, participants that gave up value in red.
The winners are the holders who left the fulcrum. The B-2 lenders were repaid at par on a claim the old structure valued at 58.7%, a gain of 41.3 points. The revolver lenders moved to first-out and gain the same 41.3 points. The 5.125% holders who sold at 97 held a claim worth nothing at this value.
The term lenders who exchanged gave up the most in dollars. B-3 and B-4 lenders went from 58.7% to the second-out’s 22.3%, 36.4 points each, or $258.8 million and $266.0 million. In the answer’s words, they lose “because they now sit behind the new money.” They received 30 and 35 basis points of extra spread and about 1.7 years of extra maturity for it.
| B | C | D | G | H | I | J | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 47 | Holder group | Status | Principal / claim | Pre-deal recovery (%) | Post-deal recovery or cash price (%) | Change (pts) | Value captured / (given up) |
| 48 | Term Loan B-2 lenders (repaid at par) | Participating | 1,175.0 | 58.7% | 100.0% | 41.3% | 485.8 |
| 49 | Term Loan B-3 lenders, exchanged into B-6 | Participating | 711.4 | 58.7% | 22.3% | (36.4%) | (258.8) |
| 50 | Term Loan B-3 holdouts (third lien) | Non-participating | 2.7 | 58.7% | 0.0% | (58.7%) | (1.6) |
| 51 | Term Loan B-4 lenders, exchanged into B-7 | Participating | 731.3 | 58.7% | 22.3% | (36.4%) | (266.0) |
| 52 | Revolver lenders, exchanged into first-out RCF | Participating | 488.8 | 58.7% | 100.0% | 41.3% | 202.1 |
| 53 | Revolver holdouts (third lien) | Non-participating | 63.8 | 58.7% | 0.0% | (58.7%) | (37.4) |
| 54 | 4.125% holders, exchanged into 9.750% second lien | Participating | 432.0 | 58.7% | 0.0% | (58.7%) | (253.4) |
| 55 | 4.125% holders, exchanged into 4.375% second-out | Participating | 238.0 | 58.7% | 22.3% | (36.4%) | (86.6) |
| 56 | 4.125% holders, repurchased for cash | Participating | 63.6 | 58.7% | 84.0% | 25.3% | 16.1 |
| 57 | 4.125% holdouts (liens released) | Non-participating | 4.0 | 58.7% | 0.0% | (58.7%) | (2.3) |
| 58 | 5.125% holders, repurchased for cash | Participating | 104.0 | 0.0% | 97.0% | 97.0% | 100.9 |
| 59 | 5.125% holdouts | Non-participating | 170.0 | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0 |
| 60 | 5.500% holders (not offered) | Not offered | 485.0 | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0 |
| 61 | New-money 8.125% first-out noteholders | New money | 1,430.0 | 100.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0 |
| 63 | Total value captured / (given up): participating | (60.0) | |||||
| 64 | Total value captured / (given up): non-participating | (41.3) | |||||
| 65 | Total value captured / (given up): new money | 0.0 | |||||
| 66 | Reconciliation: new money not paid to existing holders (fees, expenses, accrued interest) | 100.7 | |||||
| 67 | Total value change to existing holders (participating + non-participating) | (101.3) | |||||
| 68 | Difference (rounding in reported principal) | (0.6) |
One participating group ends where the holdouts do. The 4.125% holders who took $432 million of 9.750% second-lien notes fall from 58.7% to 0% at this value, the same 58.7 points as the holdouts, in exchange for 563 basis points of coupon and 2.2 more years. At the stressed value that is $253.4 million.
The holdouts lost the same 58.7 points on far smaller claims, $70.5 million in total (our arithmetic), so their $41.3 million is small next to the participants’ losses.
Liquidity runway and the maturity wall
From September 30, 2026, the credit group starts with $894 million of liquidity and burns $25.9 million a quarter at trough EBITDA, after funding the parent’s dividend. Liquidity is $686.6 million after eight quarters. The first funded maturity is the $225 million A/R facility on November 6, 2028, and the next maturity wall is 2029.
| B | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 12 | Quarter ending | 12/31/2026 | 3/31/2027 | 6/30/2027 | 9/30/2027 | 12/31/2027 | 3/31/2028 | 6/30/2028 | 9/30/2028 |
| 13 | Beginning liquidity | 894.0 | 868.1 | 842.1 | 816.2 | 790.3 | 764.4 | 738.4 | 712.5 |
| 14 | EBITDA (trough run-rate) | 95.5 | 95.5 | 95.5 | 95.5 | 95.5 | 95.5 | 95.5 | 95.5 |
| 15 | (-) Cash interest | (76.2) | (76.2) | (76.2) | (76.2) | (76.2) | (76.2) | (76.2) | (76.2) |
| 16 | (-) Capital expenditures | (18.3) | (18.3) | (18.3) | (18.3) | (18.3) | (18.3) | (18.3) | (18.3) |
| 17 | (-) Cash taxes | (5.0) | (5.0) | (5.0) | (5.0) | (5.0) | (5.0) | (5.0) | (5.0) |
| 18 | (-) Parent dividend funding | (18.3) | (18.3) | (18.3) | (18.3) | (18.3) | (18.3) | (18.3) | (18.3) |
| 19 | (-) Scheduled term loan amortization | (3.6) | (3.6) | (3.6) | (3.6) | (3.6) | (3.6) | (3.6) | (3.6) |
| 20 | Free cash flow ($M) | (25.9) | (25.9) | (25.9) | (25.9) | (25.9) | (25.9) | (25.9) | (25.9) |
| 21 | (-) Funded debt maturities in quarter | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 22 | Net change in liquidity | (25.9) | (25.9) | (25.9) | (25.9) | (25.9) | (25.9) | (25.9) | (25.9) |
| 23 | Ending liquidity ($M) | 868.1 | 842.1 | 816.2 | 790.3 | 764.4 | 738.4 | 712.5 | 686.6 |
Starting liquidity is the $170 million of cash that sits with the local media business, out of Sinclair’s $659 million, plus $574 million available on the first-out revolver and $150 million on the A/R facility. Each quarter the model takes $95.5 million of trough EBITDA and pays $76.2 million of cash interest, $18.3 million of capex at the fiscal 2025 rate, $5 million of cash taxes, $18.3 million of dividend funding and $3.6 million of term loan amortization.
The taxes and the dividend line are analyst assumptions; funding the parent’s dividend is, in the Assumptions sheet’s words, a “conservative leakage case”. At the average burn, the implied runway is 34.5 quarters.
| B | E | F | G | H | J | K | L | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5 | Structure | 12/31/2027 | 12/31/2028 | 12/31/2029 | 12/31/2030 | 12/31/2032 | 12/31/2033 | Total |
| 6 | Pre-transaction (Dec 31, 2024) | 274.0 | 714.0 | 731.0 | 1,222.0 | - | - | 4,116.0 |
| 7 | Post-transaction (at close) | 170.0 | 2.7 | 711.4 | 1,220.3 | 238.0 | 1,862.0 | 4,204.4 |
| 8 | Current (Sep 30, 2026) | - | 225.0 | 608.0 | 1,113.0 | 238.0 | 1,862.0 | 4,046.0 |
The model sets a wall as a year with $500 million or more due, above trough EBITDA, an analyst threshold. On the current structure that year is 2029, with $608 million of B-6 due December 31, 2029. Across 2029 and 2030, $1,721 million falls due, and the $575 million first-out revolver expires on February 12, 2030. Before the transaction the wall was 2026, with $1,175 million of B-2 inside the eight quarters from December 31, 2024.
The current structure carries none of the holdout claims, and a follow-up check confirms why. The $2.7 million B-3 stub, due April 1, 2028 and so inside the window, was repurchased in July 2026, “bought for $3M, so at or near par” in Compound’s words. Of the two $37.5 million third-lien revolver tranches, the original non-extended one matured on December 4, 2025, and the remaining tranche was cancelled in July 2026. The current structure, the runway and the “maturity inside the runway” flag, NO, stand.
| B | C | F | G | H | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 56 | Holdout claim | Status at Sep 30, 2026 | At close ($M) | At Dec 31, 2025 ($M) | At Sep 30, 2026 ($M) |
| 57 | Term Loan B-3, non-participating (third lien, due Apr 1, 2028) | Repaid: repurchased Jul 2026, $3M for $3M | 2.7 | 3.0 | 0.0 |
| 58 | Revolver tranche due Dec 4, 2025, non-participating (third lien) | Matured Dec 4, 2025 | 37.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 59 | Revolver tranche due Apr 21, 2027, non-participating (third lien) | Canceled Jul 2026 ($38M capacity) | 37.5 | 37.5 | 0.0 |
| 60 | Total | 77.7 | 40.5 | 0.0 | |
| 61 | Check: outstanding at Sep 30, 2026 less included in current structure | 0.0 |
Holdout recovery against enterprise value, and the flags
In the model the B-3 and revolver holdouts recover nothing at any value up to $4,000 million, 10.5x trough EBITDA, and the released 4.125% holdouts nothing up to $4,250 million. Before the transaction, the same claims were at 98.0% at $4,000 million.
Recovery of the holdouts' claims by enterprise value, before and after the transaction
Recovery as a share of claim. Enterprise value in US$ millions; the stressed case is $2,415 million
Compound's Sensitivity tab, rows 11 to 25.
| B | C | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | M | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 10 | Enterprise value ($M) | EV / trough EBITDA (x) | Pre: first lien (holdouts' original class) | Post: third lien (B-3 and revolver holdouts) | Change: B-3 / revolver holdout (pts) | Post: unsecured (released 4.125% holdouts) | Change: 4.125% holdout (pts) | Pre: unsecured notes (5.125%, 5.500%) | Post: unsecured notes (5.125%, 5.500%) | Post: second-out first lien (participants, reference) |
| 11 | 1,500 | 3.9x | 36.0% | 0.0% | (36.0%) | 0.0% | (36.0%) | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| 12 | 1,750 | 4.6x | 42.2% | 0.0% | (42.2%) | 0.0% | (42.2%) | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| 13 | 2,000 | 5.2x | 48.4% | 0.0% | (48.4%) | 0.0% | (48.4%) | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| 14 | 2,250 | 5.9x | 54.6% | 0.0% | (54.6%) | 0.0% | (54.6%) | 0.0% | 0.0% | 12.8% |
| 15 | 2,500 | 6.5x | 60.8% | 0.0% | (60.8%) | 0.0% | (60.8%) | 0.0% | 0.0% | 27.2% |
| 16 | 2,750 | 7.2x | 67.0% | 0.0% | (67.0%) | 0.0% | (67.0%) | 0.0% | 0.0% | 41.6% |
| 17 | 3,000 | 7.9x | 73.2% | 0.0% | (73.2%) | 0.0% | (73.2%) | 0.0% | 0.0% | 56.1% |
| 18 | 3,250 | 8.5x | 79.4% | 0.0% | (79.4%) | 0.0% | (79.4%) | 0.0% | 0.0% | 70.5% |
| 19 | 3,500 | 9.2x | 85.6% | 0.0% | (85.6%) | 0.0% | (85.6%) | 0.0% | 0.0% | 84.9% |
| 20 | 3,750 | 9.8x | 91.8% | 0.0% | (91.8%) | 0.0% | (91.8%) | 0.0% | 0.0% | 99.3% |
| 21 | 4,000 | 10.5x | 98.0% | 0.0% | (98.0%) | 0.0% | (98.0%) | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% |
| 22 | 4,250 | 11.1x | 100.0% | 63.3% | (36.7%) | 0.0% | (100.0%) | 21.6% | 0.0% | 100.0% |
| 23 | 4,500 | 11.8x | 100.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 33.1% | (66.9%) | 53.6% | 33.1% | 100.0% |
| 24 | 4,750 | 12.4x | 100.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 69.9% | (30.1%) | 85.5% | 69.9% | 100.0% |
| 25 | 5,000 | 13.1x | 100.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |
The holdouts lose more than 20 points in 12 of the 15 rows of the grid, and the released 4.125% holdouts in 14 of them (our count). The loss narrows only where value covers the second-out in full: at $4,250 million the third lien recovers 63.3% and at $4,500 million it is whole. The second-out, by contrast, starts recovering at $2,250 million and is nearly whole at $3,750 million.
The grid also shows a cost the request did not ask about. The 5.125% and 5.500% notes recover 21.6% before the deal at $4,250 million and nothing after it, because the new money added claims ahead of them. At $4,500 million they recover 53.6% before and 33.1% after.
The three flags on the Flags tab:
| Flag | Result | Detail |
|---|---|---|
| A non-participating class lost more than 20 points of recovery | Yes | B-3, revolver and 4.125% holdouts each fall 58.7 points, to 0% |
| A funded maturity inside the 8-quarter runway | No | The window ends September 30, 2028, and the A/R facility matures 37 days later. Yes before the deal and at close |
| New money primes existing first lien | Yes | $1,430 million of first-out notes rank ahead of $2,183 million of former first-lien claims |
What the public filings cannot tell you
The 8-Ks and the debt tables give the terms, the amounts and the ranks. The payment waterfall between first-out and second-out, the collateral each class can reach and the room left for more priming debt sit in documents and data the filings do not fully give, and the answer lists what to ask the company or its advisers for.
- Restricted-group financials. STG restricted-group financials and covenant EBITDA, cash held at STG against Sinclair, Inc., and remaining capacity for distributions and unrestricted-subsidiary investments. These replace the local media segment as a proxy for the credit group and the dividend leakage assumption.
- The intercreditors. The first-out and second-out and junior-lien intercreditors: the payment waterfall, any first-out caps, turnover provisions, and the voting thresholds that allowed the subordination.
- Collateral. The answer notes that “FCC licenses can’t be pledged directly, so the license subsidiaries and proceeds matter”, along with excluded assets and how much receivables value the A/R securitization takes.
- Priming capacity. Remaining room for more priming debt, and the protections the new documents carry: sacred rights, pro rata sharing and open-market purchase limits.
- The final count. Final participation by tranche after the exchange offer, any holdout litigation, the transaction fees, and current projections. The answer points out that the support agreement 8-K carried cleansing projections.
Our view
The workbook does what a creditor needs from an uptier analysis: it ranks every claim before and after, prices each leg against the market, and shows that at a stressed value the holdouts and the second-lien exchangers end up in the same place. We would keep the structure and spend the diligence on the intercreditors and on the stressed value.
The result on the holdouts is harsh, and it rests on the enterprise value. At $2,414.7 million the second-out absorbs all value below its claims, so everything junior to it gets nothing. The holdouts need roughly $4.1 billion before they see a dollar, and no point on the peer range applied to trough EBITDA gets there: the highest peer multiple, 8.4x, on $382 million gives about $3.2 billion (our arithmetic). These are the model’s results under its assumptions, not a view on Sinclair’s credit.
The other side is that the comparison runs against a counterfactual that did not exist. The old structure had $1,175 million due in 2026, inside its own runway, and the recoveries before the deal assume that structure reaches a default intact. The participants traded rank for time and coupon, and the model’s runway, beyond eight quarters at trough with no maturity inside it, is what they bought.
Three things would change our view: intercreditor terms that cap the first-out or give the second-out turnover rights, collateral outside the license subsidiaries that sits beyond the secured classes, and restricted-group cash flow that differs materially from the local media segment. From here the work is a credit agreement analysis of the new credit agreement and the Seventh Amendment.
Sinclair uptier creditor analysis (Excel)Compound’s workbook from this run: a Summary with the flags, an Assumptions sheet with a source or reason beside every input, the Cap_Table before, after and today, the Exchange economics by leg and holder group, the Valuation, Recovery by class and tranche, the holdout Sensitivity, the eight-quarter Runway, Maturities, Flags and Sources.Download · FreeFAQ
What is a non-pro-rata uptier exchange?
A majority of lenders amend the credit agreement to let the borrower issue debt that ranks ahead of the existing first lien, and exchange their own loans into new senior or second-out debt. Lenders outside the group keep their old claims, now junior. In Sinclair’s case the holdouts were subordinated to a third lien or had their liens released, and in Compound’s model they fall from 58.7% to 0% at the stressed value.
How do you find the fulcrum security after an uptier?
Rebuild the claims by rank after the transaction, set a stressed enterprise value, and run strict priority until value runs out. The fulcrum is the class where value runs out partway through. For Sinclair it moves from the old pari passu first lien to the second-out, which recovers 22.3% at $2,342.2 million of distributable value.
Do participating lenders always gain in a liability management transaction?
Not at a stressed value. In this model the B-2 and revolver lenders gain 41.3 points, but the B-3 and B-4 exchangers lose 36.4 points by sitting behind the new money, and the 4.125% holders who took second-lien notes lose 58.7 points in exchange for a 563 basis point higher coupon.
How do you measure the value a company captures in a distressed exchange?
Take the discount to par on every leg, then compare it with what the old debt traded at before the deal. Sinclair exchanged at par and bought back notes at 84 and 97, so the discount captured was $13.3 million, and it paid $12.7 million above December 31, 2024 market prices on the buybacks. The cost to the company shows up in cash interest, up $56.6 million a year.





